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This paper shows how post earnings announcement drift may arise in a capital market
with rational investors if the ﬁrm’s earnings in consecutive periods are positively corre-
lated and there is a ﬁxed supply of the ﬁrm’s shares. This result is driven by the fact that
equilibrium share prices depend on the forward looking information contained in current
earnings and the amount of risk that the ﬁxed supply of shares imposes on the investors.
If the latter is sufﬁciently large, share prices will be relatively rigid with respect to the for-
ward looking information contained in current earnings. Hence, good (bad) news yields
an increase (decrease) in the equilibrium price that is too small compared to the informa-
tion that is released in the earnings announcement, so that positive (negative) abnormal
returns are likely to occur again in the next period.
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11 Introduction
Post earnings announcement drift is generally considered to be a capital market anomaly. It
was ﬁrst documented by Ball and Brown (1968), and refers to the predictability of future ab-
normal returns based on previous quarterly earnings announcements. In subsequent years,
numerous studies aimed at giving an explanation for this phenomenon, e.g. Joy, Litzenberger
and McEnally (1977), Watts (1978), Rendleman, Jones and Latane (1982), and Foster, Olsen
and Shevlin (1984). Freeman and Tse (1989) and Bernard and Thomas (1989) show that a
disproportionately large fraction of the drift is delayed until the next quarterly earnings an-
nouncement. Following this observation, Bernard and Thomas (1990) attribute post earnings
announcement drift to investors not fully recognizing the implications of current earnings on
future earnings. More speciﬁcally, investors form their expectations on the basis of quarterly
earnings following a seasonal random walk, thereby ignoring the well-documented positive
correlationoftwosubsequentquarterlyearnings(e.g. Foster(1977), BrownandRozeff (1979),
Bathke and Lorek (1984), Brown, Grifﬁn, Hagerman and Zmijewski (1987)). In contrast to
Bernard and Thomas (1990), Ball and Bartov (1996) claims that investors are aware of the
intertemporal correlation of quarterly earnings. Post earnings announcement drift emerges
because investors underestimate this correlation. Soffer and Lys (1999) reconciles the two
contrasting perspectives of Bernard and Thomas (1990) and Ball and Bartov (1996) by argu-
ing that investors’ expectationsincorporate more and more of the serial correlation in quarterly
earnings as the quarter progresses.
Post earnings announcement drift is part of a more general pattern of asset pricing
anomalies. Empirical evidence shows that following a public information event, capital mar-
kets underreact in the short run (i.e. positively correlated abnormal returns, see e.g. Grinblatt,
Masulis and Titman (1984), Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991), and Loughran and Ritter
(1995)) and overreact in the long run (i.e. negatively correlated abnormal returns, see e.g.
DeBondt and Thaler (1985), Fama and French (1988), and Poterba and Summers (1988)).
This return predictability is considered to be inconsistent with capital market efﬁciency. Re-
cently, several behavioral theories have been proposed that feature the aforementioned under-
and overreaction in capital markets (see e.g. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998),
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny(1998), and Hong and Stein (1999)). These theories are all based
on bounded rationality of investors.
Thispaper takes a theoretical approach toexplainingcapital market under- and overreac-
tion and post earnings announcement drift in particular. It examines the equilibrium behavior
of stock prices in a capital market with positive correlation in quarterly earnings. The model
2considers two periods. At the start of each period (i.e. quarter), investors can trade in a risky
asset and a risk free asset. The risky asset represents a share of a particular ﬁrm, which quar-
terly earnings are positively correlated. The number of shares of this ﬁrm is exogenously
given and the same in both periods. In other words, there is a ﬁxed supply of the risky asset
in the capital market. At the end of each period, earnings are publicly announced and paid as
dividends to investors . Finally, investors are perfectly rational, constant absolute risk averse
expected utility maximizers.
It is shown that in equilibrium, the capital market underreacts to the news in the ﬁrst
period earnings announcementif the autocorrelationin earnings is sufﬁcientlyhigh and if there
is a sufﬁciently large amount of risk in the capital market. The explanation for this result is the
following. The second period equilibrium price of the risky asset depends positively on the
information that ﬁrst period earnings provides about second period earnings and negatively on
the amount of risk in the market. The latter follows from the fact that investors are (increasing
relative) risk averse and that the supply of the risky asset is ﬁxed. So, if more risk has to be
allocated to the same populationof investors, the equilibriumprice should decrease to clear the
market. In particular, if the risk is sufﬁciently large, the forward looking informationcontained
in ﬁrst period earnings has an insigniﬁcant effect on price. Hence, if ﬁrst period earnings are
high, the second period price increases, but it increases too little compared to the positivenews
that high ﬁrst period earnings provide about second period earnings. Similarly, if ﬁrst period
earnings are low, the second period price decreases too little compared to the negative news
of low ﬁrst period earnings. Since the second period equilibrium price is relatively rigid with
respect to new information, second period abnormal returns are likely to have the same sign as
in the ﬁrst period, that is post earnings announcement drift emerges.
It is further shown that capital market overreaction arises if the correlation in earnings
is sufﬁciently low. This may explain the long run reversal in the return pattern. Assuming a
sufﬁciently high amount of risk in the market, short run correlation in earnings can be sufﬁ-
ciently high to induce underreaction. Since the correlation in earnings diminishes as the lag in
earnings increases, the short run underreaction will eventually be followed by an overreaction.
Post earnings announcement drift thus arises naturally in a capital market with perfectly
rational investors if there is more risk than investors can bear. Too much risk results in a price
rigidity that prevents prices from fully reﬂecting all publicly available information. This return
predictability, however, need not imply that capital markets are inefﬁcient. Efﬁciency requires
that no publicly available information is ignored in setting the equilibrium prices. This still
holds true for the capital market presented in this paper. In fact, the return predictability of
3post earnings announcement drift is necessary to adjust the investors’ demand so as to meet
the exogenous supply. Hence, the abnormal returns do not arise from a delayed price response,
they are just to compensate for the risk that investors have to bear.
What is important to observe, is that capital market efﬁciency does not imply that fu-
ture abnormal returns are not predictable. Most empirical studies on capital market efﬁciency
erroneously rely on the validity of this implication. Extreme caution is therefore required in
interpreting the existing empirical evidence on capital market (in)efﬁciency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoreti-
cal model. Section 2.1 shows under which conditions under-/overreaction occurs in a capital
market. Focus will be speciﬁcally on short term underreaction in terms of post earnings an-
nouncement drift. Section 2.2 then shows how a reversal in the return pattern can arise in
equilibrium, while Section 2.3 discusses the robustness of the results. Section 3 deals with the
implications on capital market efﬁciency and Section 4 concludes.
2 Abnormal returns in a capital market
Consider a capital market with one risky and one risk free asset over a horizon of two periods.




















































































































0. Observe that earnings can be either high or low
and that the distribution of second period earnings depends on ﬁrst period earnings. More



























with empirical observations (e.g. Foster (1977), Brown and Rozeff (1979), Bathke and Lorek














2. The payoff structures of the
4risky asset and the risk free asset are common knowledge to all investors. I assume that the
ﬁrm has issued a ﬁxed number of shares
￿
z, so that supply of the risky asset is the same in
each period. The rationale for this assumption arises from the fact that ﬁrms issue shares only
occasionally, especially compared to the frequency of quarterly earnings announcements. So,
for examining the equilibrium price behavior in a two-quarter window, one may consider the
number of shares to be ﬁxed. Finally, I assume that investors can borrow the risk free asset at
no additional cost.




























start of each period, each investor
i
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2. At the start of




1 of the risky asset becomes public information,
so that subsequent trade is conditional on this information.
The notion of absolute risk aversion is based on additive changes in risk. Given a risky
payoff
~










gate payoff. Then the degree of absolute risk aversion measures how an investor’s valuation
for the share
~
y changes with his initial wealth
!
i. The general opinion is that absolute risk
aversion should be nonincreasing in initial wealth, which means that investors become less
risk averse the richer they get. Constant absolute risk aversion comprises the special case that
the degree of risk aversion is independent of the initial wealth. More important for this study,
however, is the notion of relative risk aversion which is based on proportional changes in risk.
Let
z denote the number of shares that an investor possessesso that his aggregate payoff equals
z
~
y. Then the degree of relative risk aversion measures how an investor’s valuation per share
~
y changes with the number of shares
z in his possession. The general opinion is that relative
risk aversion should increase with the number of shares. This means that investors become
more risk averse if they invest more in the same share. One can show that constant absolute
risk aversion implies increasing relative risk aversion.1
In a competitive equilibrium, investors are price takers. Given the prices of the two as-
sets, each investor will demand the quantities that maximize his expected utility. Then equilib-
rium prices are prices for which the aggregate demand for the risky asset equals the exogenous
supply.
1This implication is not obvious. For a more extensive discussion of absolute and relative risk aversion, see
e.g. Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995).
5Let
￿





2. The price of the risk free





1 of the ﬁrm, the same holds true for the second period price
￿




h denote the second period equilibrium price for the risky asset if ﬁrst period










l denote the equilibrium price if ﬁrst












t denote the demand of investor
i
2










t denote the demand for the risk free asset. Since the second period trade is conditional






























) denote the second period demands
for the two assets if ﬁrst period earnings are high and low, respectively.










) as the maximum expected utility that investor
i can obtain in the second period if
his budget in the second period equals







l, and the price




























































































































































































































































) constitute a compet-
itive equilibrium if the following conditions hold true:
(i) The ﬁrst period demands maximize expected utility given the second period equilibrium

































































































































(iii) Conditional on the ﬁrst period earnings being low, the second period demands maximize


















































































































































1 of the ﬁrst period portfolio.
















(v) Conditionalontheﬁrst periodearningsbeinghigh, thesecondperioddemandsmaximize







































































































































2.1 Capital market underreaction and overreaction
The second period equilibrium price is expected to take into account the information that ﬁrst
period earnings provide about the distribution of second period earnings. The extent to which
price reﬂects this information may lead to under- or overreaction by the capital market. Under-
reaction implies that price changes are too small in relation to the information that is revealed,
yielding a positive correlation in abnormal returns. Similarly, overreaction implies that prices
change too much in relation to the information that is revealed, resulting in a negative correla-
tion in abnormal returns.

















































































































































































following proposition concerns the covariance in abnormal returns.










































































Capital market underreaction, i.e. positively correlated abnormal returns, arises if the
second period conditional expected return is higher if ﬁrst period earnings are high than if
ﬁrst period earnings are low. Capital market overreaction, i.e. negatively correlated abnormal
returns, arises if the opposite holds. Obviously, correlation in abnormal returns is zero if ﬁrst
period earnings do not provide any information about second period earnings. Since in that








1 equals the unconditional return
~
r






























For determining the conditional expected returns, one requires the second period equi-



































































































) measures the total risk that the investors have to bear due to the ﬁxed supply
￿
z
of the risky asset. The denominator measures the aggregate risk tolerance of the population
of investors. An increase in the number of shares
￿






risk burden, while an increase in the population of investors decreases this risk burden as it
increases their risk sharing opportunities.
Observethatthesecondperiodequilibriumprice dependspositivelyonthe probabilityof
high second period earnings and negativelyon the risk burden. The latter follows from the fact























h is derived analogously.
8exogenoussupply
￿
z of shares (cf. Wilson(1968)). Since investors’risk aversion increases with
the number of shares, the equilibrium price must be lower if more shares have to be allocated
to the investors.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique value
x





































Since post earnings announcement drift refers to underreaction, the next result follows
straightforwardly.
Corollary 3 Post earnings announcement drift arises in a capital market if investors bear a
sufﬁciently high amount of risk.
For the explanation of this result, recall that post earnings announcement drift arises if





























). The two major determinants of the expected return are the probability
of high second period earnings and the second period equilibrium price. A higher probability
increases the expected return while a higher price decreases the expected return. The equilib-
rium price also depends on the probability of high earnings but this inﬂuence diminishes as
the risk burden increases. This observation, which is illustrated in Figure 1, drives Corollary
3 and Proposition 2. For suppose that the risk burden
x is relatively high, then the probability









l. Since the probability of high second period earnings is
larger if ﬁrst period earnings are high than if ﬁrst period earnings are low, the same holds true
for the conditional expected return. Hence, the market underreacts.
This argument no longer holds true if the risk burden is relatively low. In that case,
the probability of high second period earnings has a signiﬁcant effect on the second period
equilibrium price. So, although high ﬁrst period earnings yield a higher success probability
in the second period then low ﬁrst period earnings, it also yields a signiﬁcantly higher price.
Since the success probability and price have opposite effects on the expected return, the total
effect is unclear. In fact, if the risk burden is sufﬁciently low, the negative effect of price
dominates and overreaction results.
Observe that Proposition 2 reverses if earnings are negatively correlated. In that case,




￿, and overreacts if the




























Figure 1: Second period equilibrium price as a function of the probability of high second

















Summarizing, capital market underreaction arises because a high risk burden induces a
certain amount of price rigidity for the risky asset with respect to characteristics of the risky
asset’s distribution. As a result, prices cannot change in such a way so as to fully reﬂect
all the forward looking information that is contained in ﬁrst period earnings. Following the
good news of high ﬁrst period earnings, the second period equilibrium price will be too low
relative to the probability of high second period earnings, so that investors will most likely
earn positive abnormal returns in the second period again. A similar argument holds if low
ﬁrst period earnings are announced. Then the second period equilibrium price will be too high
relative to the probability of high second period earnings, so that investors will most likely
earn negative abnormal returns in the second period again.
2.2 Long run reversals
Proposition 2 shows how under- and overreaction may arise in a capital market. Which of the
two actually occurs depends on some ﬁrm-speciﬁc paramters. Proposition 2 does, however,
not explain the reversal of return patterns in the long run. Overreaction follows underreaction
if the positive correlation in earnings is followed by a negative correlation. There is, however,
no empirical evidence to support such correlation pattern in earnings. Bernard and Thomas
10(1990) claim that seasonally differenced quarterly earnings follow such a correlation pattern,
but Jacob, Lys and Sabino (2000) show that this is due to overdifferencing of the earnings
time-series.
This section shows how for an individual ﬁrm the short run underreaction may change















l be distributed as before


















0. So, high ﬁrst period earnings now entail good news in two ways:
it not only increases the probability of high second period earnings, but it also increases the



































































































































































































































































The new payoff structure affects the second period equilibrium price in the following










l. If ﬁrst period earnings are high, the earnings
￿ will be taken into account by
the second period equilibrium price. In fact, due to the assumption of constant absolute risk












￿. For the same reason as before, a high risk burden
induces underreaction by the capital market. The earnings
￿, however, induce overreaction.

































































which is decreasing in
￿. Since the negativeeffect of




































































q, then there exists a unique critical value
x
￿ for the risk burden






















The difference with Proposition 2 is easily explained. Recall that underreaction occurs if
the risk burden is sufﬁciently high. Furthermore, the magnitude of the underreaction increases
with the magnitude of the correlation in earnings. The higher the correlation, the more the
market will underreact. Then the retained earnings induce overreaction that dominates the
underreaction only if the latter is sufﬁciently low. This is so if the correlation in earnings is










Proposition 4 explains why underreaction may occur in the short run and overreaction
in the long run. To see this, extend the model by replicating the second period to
T periods.













T depends on the earnings of the previous
period in a similar way as in the











































































Observe that the correlation decreases as the lag in earnings increases but that the correlation
remains positive. Taking the earnings surprise at
t
=
1as the event date, one can consider the
correlation in abnormal returns in period




4, if both the risk burden and the correlation in lag-one earnings is sufﬁciently high, abnormal
returns in period
1 and
2 are positively correlated. Increasing the lag in earnings to
k periods,
decreases the correlation. Hence, the positive correlation in abnormal returns in period
1 and
k also decreases. Increasing the lag in earnings even further will eventually result in such a
low level of correlation in earnings that the correlation in abnormal returns becomes negative
(cf. Proposition 4). Consequently, short term underreaction is followed by an overreaction.
2.3 Robustness of the results
The model assumes that the supply of the risky asset is exogenous and independent of any
new information in the second period. One can endogenize the supply level by extending the
12model and obtain as such an equilibrium value for the supply level. Then post earnings an-
nouncement drift may cease to exist if the equilibrium value of supply yields a risk burden
x that coincides with the critical value
x
￿, for in that case correlation between abnormal re-
turns will be zero. Although one cannot exclude this possibility in the present model, one can
construct a model where the supply is endogenously determined but constant over all periods,
in which the equilibrium value of
x differs from
x
￿. For this, one needs to extend the state
space by introducing some uncertainty about the probabilities
q and
r. For instance, before
ﬁrst period trade starts, let nature determine the probabilities
q and



























). Furthermore, suppose that the supply of the risky asset is deter-
mined endogenously before the state of nature is determined, but that investors learn the state
of nature before ﬁrst period trade starts. In this regard one can interpret the choice of nature as
the ‘history’ of the risky asset between the date of issue of the risky asset and the two periods
that are explicitly considered in the model. Then zero correlation in abnormal return arises




























) varies with the probabilities
q and
r, this condition is violated. Hence, the exogenous
supply level is not crucial for the results.
An implicit assumptionof the model is that the risk burden does not change over the two
periods and, particularly, that it is independent of the ﬁrst period earnings. By allowingthe risk
burden to vary, zero correlation in abnormal returns may arise in equilibrium. However, the
factors that determine the risk burden do not change frequently over time. Firms issue shares
to acquire capital from investors. The frequency of such an event is relatively low compared
to the production of information like quarterly earnings ﬁgures. A similar argument holds
for the number of investors. Risk sharing arguments yield that, in equilibrium, all potential
investors will actually invest in the risky asset. Hence, new information will have no effect on
the population of investors.
Theassumptionof constantabsoluteriskaversionisnotvitalforsupportingtheresultsof
this paper. Constant absolute risk aversion enabled me to explicitly determine the equilibrium
prices. What drives the results is that the inﬂuence of the probability distribution of the risky
asset on the equilibrium price becomes insigniﬁcant as the risk burden increases (cf. Figure 1).
This is due to the increasing relative risk aversion of investors. For constant relative risk averse
investors, for instance, this no longer holds true as investors’ valuation for the risky shares is
independent of the quantity they receive. Hence, an increase in the risk burden through an
increase in the supply
￿
z would have no effect on the equilibrium price.
133 Capital market efﬁciency
The results of this paper also shed a new light on the implications of capital market efﬁciency.
Following Fama (1976), capital market efﬁciency requires that all publicly available informa-
tion is used in setting the equilibrium prices. More formally, let
I
a denote the information that
is available to the capital market and let
I
m denote the information that the capital market actu-






a, that is no available information is ignored. Capital market efﬁciency is generally
phrased as prices fully reﬂect all available information in the market. There is, however, no
formal deﬁnition of what ‘fully reﬂect’ means in this respect. The general interpretation is that
prices fully reﬂect all available information
I
a if one cannot predict future abnormal returns on
the basis of this available information
I
a. Empirical evidence claiming (in)efﬁciency of capital
markets is commonly based on this predictability argument.
As this paper shows, capital market efﬁciency does not automatically imply that future
abnormal returns are not predictable. In a capital market, prices are used to reﬂect information
about future payoffs and to clear the market. Since the latter must occur in equilibrium, there
may be too few degrees of freedom left to accomplish the former. That this may give rise to
predictable future abnormal returns is not an inefﬁciency of the market. On the contrary, the
market creates this predictability to increase demand for the risky asset so as to meet the ﬁxed
supply. In this regard it is important to observe that the gains resulting from predictable abnor-
mal returns are limited. If ﬁrst period earnings are high, investors are willing to invest more in
the risky asset because of the existing positive correlation. Although the rate of return of the













































h will increase the risk of the investor. Since investors are increasing relative
risk averse, the increase in risk will ultimately outweigh the abnormal return. In equilibrium,
the abnormal returns that investors earn just compensate for the additional risk that investors
have to take. Hence, post earnings announcement drift may not be driven by a delayed price
response, the explanation that currently prevails in the literature (e.g. Bernard and Thomas
(1990), Ball and Bartov (1996), and Soffer and Lys (1999)).
Since capital market efﬁciency is not equivalent to stating that future abnormal returns
are not predictable, one should exercise caution in interpreting the results of empirical studies
on capital market efﬁciency, as these studies may be based on a false assumption. This paper
showsthatevenifitispossibletopredictfutureabnormalreturns,thisneednotbe anindication
of capital market inefﬁciency. Similarly, if it is not possible to predict future abnormal returns,
14this need not support capital market efﬁciency. The latter claim is easily explained as follows.






a. Further, suppose that it is not possible to predict future abnormal
returns on the basis of the information
I
m that the market uses. Then it is also not possible to











with equilibrium prices, it also cannot predict future abnormal returns. Hence, although future
abnormal returns cannot be predicted on the basis of all available information, the capital
market is inefﬁcient as it ignores some of the available information in setting the equilibrium
prices. To illustrate with an (extreme) example, suppose the market sets prices at random.
Obviously, such a market would not be efﬁcient. However, future abnormal returns are also
not predictable in this market.
Although efﬁcient capital markets use all available information in setting the equilib-
rium prices, not all of this information need to be ‘reﬂected’ in prices. Consequently, returns
or market prices may not be the appropriate instruments to empirically test capital market efﬁ-
ciency. For this purpose, other measures are needed that capture the use of information better
than prices do.
4 Conclusions
This paper shows how post earnings announcement drift may arise in a capital market with
rational investors if the ﬁrm’s earnings in consecutive periods are positively correlated and
the supply of the ﬁrm’s shares is ﬁxed. The ﬁxed supply of shares imposes a risk burden
on the population of investors as the risky payoffs of the shares have to be allocated among
the investors. If this risk burden is large, asset prices become rigid with respect to forward
looking information. As a result, forward looking information contained in a current earnings
announcement is not fully reﬂected in the equilibrium price and a ‘drift’ emerges. The paper
further shows how short run underreaction is followed by long run overreaction. Reason for
this is that underreaction requires a sufﬁciently high amount of correlation in earnings. Since
correlation decreases as the lag in earnings increases, overreaction will eventually arise.
Capital market under- and overreaction do not indicate capital market inefﬁciencies as
no available information is ignored in setting the equilibrium prices. What is important to
observe, is that capital market efﬁciency does not imply that future abnormal returns are not
predictable. Most empirical studies on capital market efﬁciency erroneously rely on the va-
15lidity of this implication. Extreme caution is therefore required in interpreting the existing
empirical evidence on capital market (in)efﬁciency.
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) yields a curve in
I
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) are continuous and decreasing in
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Figure 2: The inﬂuence of the risk burden






































g at most once. Figure 2(b)











































0. Figure 2(c) illustrates the situation that
precisely one intersection exists. In that case, let
x












































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿ may be negative. Since the risk burden is nonnegative by deﬁnition, a lower























































































































































































































































































































PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: Similar as in the proof of Proposition 2, abnormal returns are
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fx r()



























), is decreasing in both dimensions, and its graph is convex. Hence, it intersects at most























































































































0. So, there is negative correlation in abnormal returns whatever the value of the risk
burden
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